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This article treats a facet of international commercial arbitration that
almost always presents difficulties to the practitioner, both during the nego-
tiation of the underlying contract and in subsequent dispute proceedings,
that of controversies involving more than two parties. The peculiar "man-
in-the-middle" problem such controversies often present, especially in con-
nection with international construction projects, will first be described; the
alternatives currently available in arbitration for dealing with that problem
will then be examined; and finally a proposal for improvement will be
suggested.
II. The Commercial Context
Multiparty controversies can arise in a variety of contexts: in sales con-
tracts-for example, when a seller's supplier declares force majeure, and the
seller fails to deliver to its buyer; in licensing contracts-when a licensor
defines the scope of separate licenses for the same technology in common
terms, and licensees take conflicting actions based on different interpreta-
tions of those terms; and in investment contracts-as illustrated in the
example given by Georges Delaume earlier in the program. The most acute
difficulties, however, are probably presented in connection with construc-
tion projects. '
In a single international project to design and construct plant processing
facilities, for example, the prime contractor, say a U.S.-based company, will
have contract relations with a host of other parties:
* With the project owner, of course, commonly a governmental agency
of a Third World country involved in extensive industrial development, to
whom the prime may have complete responsibility for construction and
possibly all or part of the design responsibility as well.
* Often with specialty firms, such as a French or British firm of soils
mechanics, whose expertise is used to help establish basic design
parameters.
*Mr. Devitt practices law in San Francisco.
'See G. Bernini, Arbitration in Multi-Party Business Disputes, V Y.B. COM. ARB. 291, 291-92
(1980) (making similar observations).
670 INTERNATIONAL L,4WYER
* With a variety of subcontractors, from Europe, Asia or the Middle
East, who will pe'form portions of the assigned design and construction
work for which they have a noted technical capability or cost advantage.
e And with material suppliers from all parts of the globe.
Frequently, disputes that arise during the project will involve the prime
contractor and two or more of these parties. The owner may allege that a
part of the facilities designed and constructed by one of the subcontractors
is defective. The prime contractor will, of course, look to the concerned
subcontractor. That subcontractor may, in turn, reply that the defect arose
because of improper operation of the facilities by the owner, poor work-
manship in related portions of the facilities by another subcontractor, or
inaccurate information furnished by the soils specialist.
A similar situation can exist for the prime contractor when a subcontrac-
tor is the claimant in the first instance. The subcontractor may allege that
an owner-originated direction resulted in extra work, or that actions by the
owner or another subcontractor delayed the progress of its own work.
The special risk presented by all of these cases is that of the prime con-
tractor getting caught in the middle because different decisionmakers
render inconsistent findings of fact or inconsistent interpretations of similar
contract provisions. To use the defect example again:
* The decisionmaker in an owner-prime proceeding may conclude that a
portion of the facilities are inherently defective because of the design
adopted by the concerned subcontractor.
* A second decisionmaker in a prime-subcontractor proceeding may
conclude that a defect exists, but that it was caused by another subcontrac-
tor's poor workmanship in related work.
* A third decisionmaker in a prime-other subcontractor proceeding may
conclude that there is no defect at all, and that the poor performance of the
facilities resulted from improper operation by the owner.
In the illustration given so far, the prime contractor had the man-in-the-
middle problem. The prime had the problem in those situations because in
the absence of special limiting provisions in its contract, the owner is not
concerned whether a defect resulted from inadequacies in the prime's per-
formance or in the performance of one of the subcontractors, since the
prime is responsible to the owner in contract for both. Similarly, in the
absence of special limiting provisions, the subcontractor is not concerned
whether the owner, the prime contractor or another subcontractor caused
additional work or delay, because the subcontractor's scope of work and
schedule premises are defined in its own contract with the prime.
However, the owner or the subcontractor may be the one standing in the
middle just as often as the prime: the subcontractor, because it is in the
same position between the prime and its own sub-subcontractors as the
prime is between the owner and the subcontractor; and the owner, because
it may have split the design and construction of the facilities among a
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number of different contractors or may have itself contracted with speciality
firms to furnish preliminary information, and so may stand between the
prime and any of those parties.
Although owners have historically favored a single "turnkey" project
contract, they are turning to multiple design and construction contracts with
increasing frequency, particularly in large-scale endeavors. Generally,
dividing a large project into a series of discrete design and/or construction
packages results in more bidding competition and an earlier overall start
and completion of construction.
III. Existing Alternatives in International Arbitration
The man-in-the-middle problem can usually be adequately dealt with in
judicial proceedings, particularly proceedings conducted in the United
States.2 There are liberal joinder and consolidation provisions contained in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and many state procedural codes.3
While, as I'm sure we've all learned to our chagrin at one time or
another, these provisions, either by their terms or as applied by the courts,
do not comprehend every man-in-the-middle situation, they do encompass
the great majority of cases. Equally satisfactory mechanisms are not, how-
ever, generally available in international commercial arbitration.
In theory there are at least four methods by which a party could protect
itself against the problem: (1) by negotiating arbitration clauses authorizing
consolidation in each of the relevant contracts; (2) by entering into a sub-
mission agreement providing for consolidation with the concerned parties;
(3) by application for arbitral consolidation to a national court; or (4) by
operation of the rules of an international arbitration association. 4
But in practice each of these alternatives has major shortcomings; and,
except as to the last one, it is doubtful that the shortcomings can be elimi-
nated or sufficiently mitigated so that any one of them could be judged a
generally acceptable and available solution.
2The same is true in many other countries. See, e.g., C. PR. Civ., art. 101, 331 & 367 (F.
Grivart de Kerstrat & W. Crawford trans. 1978) (French joinder and consolidation
provisions).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a), for example, provides that a defendant may complain against any
third-party "who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him";
and Rule 42(a) provides that "when [several] actions involving a common question of law or
fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters
in issue. . . [or] may order the actions consolidated." See also e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 428.10(b) (West 1973); CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1048(a) (West 1980) (comparable California
provisions).
4The option of consolidation in a single judicial proceeding is usually not available as long
as there is at least one party who desires to enforce a contract arbitration clause. Under the
New York Convention national courts in signatory countries are required to order arbitration
upon request. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
opened for signature June 10, 1958, art. II, § 3, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, reprinted
following 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West Supp. 1982); see, e.g., McCreary Tire & Rubber Company v.
CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (3d Cir. 1974).
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A. Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration is a creature of contract, and a form of arbitration clause
authorizing consolidated proceedings could be included in all the relevant
contracts and would likely be considered valid and enforceable.5 Consoli-
dation is a matter of arbitral procedure, and many national laws of arbitra-
tion 6 and the rules of many international arbitration institutions7 permit
parties great freedom in establishing rules of procedure.
However, getting all the interested parties to agree upon arbitration
clauses with a consolidation provision is extremely difficult. The problems
of draftsmanship alone are considerable. At a recent conference on mul-
tiparty disputes, for example, no participant was willing to even venture a
proposal.8
Also, there seems to be a firmly established usage of international trade,
at least in the construction sector, that no matter how complex the technol-
ogy or financing involved, and no matter how many months or even years
are devoted to the drafting of the contract, no more than fifteen minutes can
ever be allocated to the negotiation of an arbitration clause, with fourteen
of the fifteen minutes reserved for debate on whether or not to have such a
clause at all.
I'm afraid that we lawyers will never enjoy more than passing success in
convincing our clients that the content of arbitration clauses can be as
important as the content of payment or scope-of-work clauses. Obtaining a
common basis for arbitration in a multicontract situation, such as by refer-
ence to the rules of the same arbitration institution, is probably the most
that can be realistically achieved in the majority of cases. The esoterics of
arbitral procedure will never command broad attention during the negotia-
tion process.
B. Submission Agreements
If negotiation of clauses authorizing consolidation is extremely difficult
before disputes have arisen, it is virtually impossible after the fact, because
'As to the interpretation and enforceability of consolidation clauses by United States courts,
cf. Gavlik Construction Company v. H.F. Campbell Company, 526 F.2d 777, 787-89 (3d Cir.
1976); Uniroyal, Inc. v. A. Epstein and Sons, Inc., 428 F.2d 523, 525-28 (7th Cir. 1970) (both
cases dealing with contract provisions that authorized consolidation only by implication).
6See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION LAW IN EUROPE (1981):
Austrian law at 18-19; Swiss law at 52-55 & 62; French law (Supp. to p. 149); law of England
and Wales at 166; Swedish law at 332; see generallv I-VII Y.B. CoM. ARB. Parts I (1976-82)
(Part I of each volume contains reports on national arbitration laws-53 to date.).
'See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF THE COURT OF ARBITRA-
TION [hereinafter cited as ICC RULES], art. II (Arbitration) (1975); LONDON COURT OF ARBI-
TRATION, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES [hereinafter cited as LONDON RULES], Rule 5
& Schedule of Jurisdiction and Powers of the Arbitrator at C(I) (1981); Rules of the Arbitra-
tion Institute of The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Rule 15 (1976).
'INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND PRACTICE, MULTIPARTY BUSINESS DIS-
PUTES 14 & 63 (1980); see G. Bernini, supra note I at 299; E. Singleton, The Resolution of
Multiparty Disputes, in MULTIPARTY BUSINESS DISPUTES 45, 52-53 (1980).
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one or more of the interested parties will enjoy tactical advantages from the
status quo that it does not want to surrender.
The claimant, for example, will normally have the prospect of earlier
payment without consolidation, because it need only prove the liability of
its immediate contractual partner and this can be achieved more quickly in
a single two-party proceeding. A secondary defendant, who fears it may
ultimately be found liable, may believe that the parties standing between it
and the claimant will be induced to contribute more to any settlement if
they continue to be exposed to the possibility of inconsistent findings by
different arbitrators. Considerations of overall litigation economy, substan-
tive justice and procedural fairness simply have little persuasive force in
specific adversarial situations.
C. National Arbitration Laws
Since the two direct methods of achieving consolidation are not satisfac-
tory, the next alternative to spring to any attorney's mind is "to go to
court." But "going to court" does not always work, even assuming all of the
relevant contracts call for arbitration at the same situs.
Apparently, the United States is the only country whose law clearly per-
mits the consolidation of arbitration proceedings in the absence of specific
party agreement. The Federal Arbitration Act9 applies to international
arbitrations conducted in the United States,' 0 and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 81(a)(3) makes Rule 42(a), authorizing the courts to order con-
solidation, applicable to proceedings under that act."
Unfortunately, the United States is not often selected as the situs of inter-
national construction arbitrations. To begin with, it is usually not very con-
venient. Typically, the project and most of the parties are half a world
away. Further, parties to international contracts are normally reluctant to
accept another's home country as an arbitration situs and will suggest that a
neutral location, commonly in Europe, be selected instead.
The law applicable in the leading European arbitration centers is either
adverse, silent or unsettled on the question of mandatory consolidation.
For example, under both French and Swiss law, the courts in those coun-
tries have no power to order consolidated arbitration proceedings in the
absence of party agreement, specifically expressed in either the relevant
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
'"See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-5 and 9-11 (1976).
"See, e.g., Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966,
974-76 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); Marine Trading Ltd. v. Ore Interna-
tional Corp., 432 F. Supp. 683, 684-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Robinson v. Warner, 370 F. Supp. 828,
829-31 (D.R.I. 1974).
See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 1982) (California provisions authorizing the
mandatory consolidation of arbitration proceedings).
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contract arbitration clauses or in a submission agreement.1 2 Swedish, Ger-
man and Italian law are all similar or at least silent. 13
The law of England and Wales is unsettled, although there is cause for
optimism in a recent court of appeal decision by Lord Denning. The case is
discussed in detail in the handout that will be available at the conclusion of
this afternoon's activities. 14 In brief, the court of appeal held that although
it did not have power to order consolidation in the absence of specific party
consent, it did have power to appoint the same arbitrator in two related
construction arbitrations. Further, the court suggested that the single
appointed arbitrator was free to adopt and, as a matter of policy, should
adopt a procedure whereby those issues common to both proceedings
would effectively be decided together.' 5
Although many times London will be a neutral arbitration situs accept-
able to the parties to an international construction project, this, of course,
will not always be the case. Moreover, there are some disadvantages to
arbitrating in London that in particular circumstances may outweigh the
potential to achieve consolidation. Thus, at best national arbitration laws
offer potential solutions to the man-in-the-middle problem in only a limited
number of cases.
D. Institutional Rules
More often than not arbitration clauses in international contracts will
provide that the proceedings are to be conducted under the auspices of one
of the major international arbitration institutions.
The leading such institution is the Court of Arbitration of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, whose administrative office is located in
Paris. The ICC has averaged about 250 new case filings per year over the
last several years, with an average amount in controversy of over $1,000,000
U.S. About 30 percent of the disputes submitted to the ICC arise out of
construction projects. 16
But, with one exception,' 7 neither the ICC Rules' 8 nor the rules of most
2Advice of Maitre Fernand C. Jeantet, Paris (French law), and Maitre Robert Briner, Lenz,
Schluep, Briner & De Coulon, Geneva (Swiss law); accord Concordat Suisse sur l'Arbitrage,
art. 28 (Editions Payot trans. 1974) (Swiss arbitration law applicable in most cantons).
3Advice of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (Swedish Law), Dr. Horst Bruecher, Mueller
Weitzel Weisner, Frankfurt (German law), and Avv. Giovanni DeBerti, DeBerti & Jacchia,
Milan (Italian law); see Lag om skiljeman 1929 No. 145 (as amended) (trans. in 2 International
Commercial Arbitration, Doc. VII.C.l (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1979)) (Swedish arbitration law).
'Appendix A.
"My thanks to David R. Wightman of Kenneth Brown Baker Baker, London, for his com-
ments on this case.
rY. Derains, New Trends in the Practical Application of the ICC Rules ofArbitration, 3 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 39, 39 nn. 1, 2 & 4 (1981).
'"London Rules, Rule 5(1) & Schedule of Jurisdiction and Powers of the Arbitrator at
C(l), discussed infra.
"In 1980 the ICC did adopt an internal rule authorizing the joinder of additional claims in a
pending proceeding if the claims arise between the same parties and out of the same legal
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of the other major international arbitration institutions' 9 address the ques-
tion of consolidation. 20 Apparently, those institutions are concerned that a
consolidation rule would be viewed as an infringement on party autonomy,
to which they are especially sensitive as organizations without sovereign
regulatory authority. Also, there may be a fear that a consolidation rule
would undermine the traditional appointment procedure, whereby each of
the parties nominates one arbitrator on a three-person panel.2 '
IV. A Proposal
It is submitted that these objections do not justify declining to enact at
least a limited consolidation rule. A form of proposed rule is contained in
the handout you will receive, 22 and I urge the major international arbitra-
tion institutions to consider its adoption, with such modifications as may be
appropriate.
The proposed rule has these main features:
1. The rule limits consolidation to instances involving a single interna-
tional construction project, authorizes the consolidation of just two separate
arbitration proceedings and then only when there is a party common to
both proceedings.
2. The power of the parties by specific provision to vary the terms of the
rule or to "opt-out" of the rule altogether is expressly recognized.
3. The issues to be heard and decided on a consolidated basis are speci-
fied by the arbitrators in the two pending arbitrations, including any party-
nominated arbitrators, after the parties have had an opportunity to be
heard.
4. The issues specified for consolidation are heard and decided by arbi-
trators designated by the chosen arbitral institution, from among those
already appointed and, in certain cases, an additional arbitrator.
The construction limitation is included because the man-in-the-middle
problem is encountered most frequently in that context; and because the
problem affects owners as well as engineers and contractors, so that an ame-
liorating measure should enjoy widespread support and not be viewed as a
product of parochial interests.
relationship. The joinder may be ordered even if the party making the additional claims
desires a separate arbitration. ICC Rules, art. 18 (App. II, Internal Rules of the Court of
Arbitration). An earlier-adopted rule authorizes the joinder of additional claims upon request
of the party claiming. ICC Rules, art. 16 (Arbitration).
"E.g., American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Institute of The Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce, Zurich Chamber of Commerce.
'Nor do the UNCITRAL Rules. See United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, Arbitration Rules (1976).




The limitation to the three-party situation is included for reasons of prac-
ticality. Permitting the joinder of even just a third party will, it is thought,
substantially mitigate the man-in-the-middle problem, while allowing con-
solidated proceedings between four, five or six parties might well entail
unacceptable delay.
The provisions relating to the specification, hearing and decision of the
consolidated issues are designed to maximize the participation of both the
parties and the arbitrators already appointed, consistent with fairness
accepted perceptions of impartiality and the need to avoid deadlocks.
The power to vary the rule or opt-out altogether is made express to
emphasize the parties' autonomy. In this connection it should be observed
that most institutional rules of arbitral procedure are of an"opt-out" nature:
that is, the parties do not have the burden of specifically calling for their
operation but rather the burden of disclaiming them.
Since they operate without specific party consent, such rules can, in one
sense, be viewed as infringements on party autonomy. But this burden-
shifting aspect is one of the major attractions of institutional arbitration in
the first place, because parties are thereby relieved from formulating and
agreeing upon ad hoc rules in every contract negotiation. Consequently,
the test as to whether any particular institutional rule, such as a consolida-
tion rule, should be of an opt-out rather than an opt-in nature should be its
acceptability on a general basis, and not abstract notions of party
autonomy.
Moreover, there already are a number of institutional rules of an opt-out
nature that affect significant party rights. For example, the ICC Rules pro-
vide that by submitting to arbitration, the parties are deemed "to have
waived their right to any form of appeal. ' '23 The ICC Rules also provide
for the mandatory joinder of claims between the same parties in certain
circumstances. 24 And provisions of the London Court of Arbitration
Rules25 come very close to establishing a full opt-out rule of consolidation.
Under the London Rules arbitrators are empowered to order additional
parties to be joined in a pending arbitration unless all the existing parties
"at any time agree otherwise." The drawback is that the joinder can be
effected only with the "express consent" of the parties joined, and the
''express consent" must be specifically to joinder rather than generally to
arbitration. 26
23ICC Rules, art. 24, § 2 (Arbitration).2
"ICC Rules, art. 18 (App. I1, Internal rules of the Court of Arbitration); see supra note 17 at
15.
2 London Rules, Rule 5(1) & Schedule of Jurisdiction and Powers of the Arbitrator at
C(l).
26Advice of the Deputy Registrar, London Court of Arbitration.
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V. Summary
In summary, the present methods for dealing with multiparty controver-
sies in international arbitration are unsatisfactory. The most practical solu-
tion to the problems presented is for the major arbitration institutions to
adopt rules authorizing forms of consolidation in appropriate contexts. The
construction sector is an appropriate beginning context, and workable and
generally acceptable rules can be devised.
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APPENDIX A
Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co., Ltd v. Eastern Bechtel Corporation,-
Eastern Bechtel Corporation v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries
Co., Ltd, 1981 A. No. 4268, judgment transcript (C.A. June 23, 1982).
This was a consolidated appeal from decisions appointing sole arbitrators in two
separate proceedings under the (English) Arbitration Act 1950. One arbitration was
initiated by Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company Limited (ADGLC), the owner
of complex gas liquefaction facilities on Das Island in the Arabian Gulf, against
Eastern Bechtel Corporation and Chiyoda Chemical Engineering and Construction
Co., Ltd. (B/C), a joint venture that was the prime contractor for the design and
construction of the facilities. ADGLC alleged that two large liquefied natural gas
storage tanks designed and constructed by one of B/C's subcontractors,
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (IHI), were defective. The second
arbitration was initiated by B/C against IHI.
B/C had required the High Court to appoint the same arbitrator in both
proceedings in order to avoid the possibility of inconsistent findings of fact,
particularly as to the cause of the admitted cracking of one of the two tanks.
The High Court judge (Mr. Justice Bingham) held that because he lacked
authority to order consolidated proceedings or to appoint an arbitrator subject to
conditions (e.g., that the arbitrator order consolidated proceedings), two different
arbitrators should be appointed. The judge reasoned that if a single arbitrator were
appointed, he might be prejudicially inclined to adhere to a finding made in the first
arbitration on an issue common to both proceedings, despite what different evidence
or arguments might be submitted on that same issue in the second arbitration.
The court of appeal agreed that courts have no power to order consolidation or to
impose conditions upon an appointed arbitrator. The court held, however, that it
did have power under section 10 of the Arbitration Act 1950 to appoint the same
arbitrator in separate arbitrations, 27 and that it was highly desirable to do so in
these cases in order to avoid the possibility of inconsistent findings of fact.
In dicta Lord Denning made several suggestions on how the single appointed
arbitrator should proceed: (1) the arbitrator should hold a pre-trial conference
among all three interested parties to segregate the common issues; (2) the issues
pertinent only to the first (owner-prime) arbitration should then be tried, with
recourse to the courts on point of law if necessary; (3) the common issues should be
tried next, apparently with separate hearings but with both sets of hearings taking
place before a decision was rendered in either case; and (4) if either the arbitrator or
the parties considered that the arbitrator would be prejudiced in hearing the
common issues after having decided the owner-prime issues, a different arbitrator
might be appointed to hear and decide the common issues as well as any remaining
issues.
"Section 10 of the Arbitration Act 1950 generally authorizes the High Court to appoint
arbitrators. The section does not expressly address the question of appointing the same
arbitrator in related proceedings.
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Lord Justices Watkins and Fox agreed with Lord Denning's suggestions, but Lord
Justice Watkins did emphasize that a large degree of flexibility should be allowed to
the arbitrator by the parties or insisted upon by the arbitrator. Lord Justices
Watkins and Fox also stated that prejudice as a result of the prior determination of
the owner-prime issues was unlikely in view of the caliber of the arbitrator
appointed (Sir John Megaw).
There were two major questions left open by the decision: (1) whether the
arbitrator has power to order joint hearings on the common issues in the absence of
party agreement; and (2) in what circumstances, if any, the arbitrator should or must
disqualify himself from hearing and deciding the common issues following his




1. The arbitrators in two separate proceedings under these Rules may determine
to hear and decide issues common to both proceedings on a consolidated basis,
provided that: (a) the parties to either proceeding have not precluded the arbitrators
from doing so in their agreement to arbitrate;2 8 (b) one of the parties is a party to
both proceedings; (c) both proceedings involve disputes arising out of or connected
with the same construction project; and (d) the parties in both proceedings have had
an opportunity to be heard on the question of consolidation.
2. Upon the arbitrator in each proceeding so determining, consolidated hearings
shall take place on those issues that both arbitrators have specified as common, at
times and places fixed by the arbitrators.
3. If a sole arbitrator has been appointed in each proceeding, unless the same
person has been appointed, a third arbitrator shall be appointed by the court 29 and
the three arbitrators shall hear and decide the common issues.
4. If three arbitrators have been appointed in each proceeding, none of whom has
been nominated by the parties, the common issues shall be heard and decided by
arbitrators designated by the court from among those already appointed, three in
number if at least two of the arbitrators in each proceeding are the same, otherwise
five.
5. If three arbitrators have been appointed in each proceeding, two of whom have
been nominated by the parties, the common issues shall be heard and decided by the
two arbitrators not nominated by the parties and a third arbitrator appointed by the
court.
6. If the composition of the appointed arbitrator tribunals does not fall within
sections 3-5, there shall be no consolidation in the absence of common specific
directions in the two agreements to arbitrate.
7. The decision on the common issues shall be by majority and shall be made a
part of the award in each proceeding.
8. Parties are free to vary the provisions of this article by agreement.
"eThe term "agreement to arbitrate" includes both a contract arbitration clause and a
subsequent party stipulation.
"Refers to an internal body, e.g., Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce.
